Just started blogging…actually getting pretty late into the blogging culture! Studying and doing projects to complete graduation at USC. My homepage is at http://www-scf.usc.edu/~swarup/.

The New Year brings in interesting things (or so we hope). My friend came up to me with an “infected” computer with a fantastic piece of malware installed. The malware was presented the user with a completely different HTML page when something was searched on Google. Browser Helper Objects (BHOs) are Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs) that are installed in Internet Explorer (IE) and have a complete access to the DOM tree of the browser window. The name of the DLL was xyusx.dll (or something like that). This DLL was packed so that it wouldn’t permit a clean disassembly. The usual tricks seemed to work and I was able to unpack the DLL.

The procedure is simple. Open the DLL in OllyDbg. Search for the PUSHAD instruction (this instruction stores all the registers on the top of the stack) and set a breakpoint (F2 key in OllyDbg) on that instruction.

Press F9 to continue the debugging. Press F8 to execute the instruction, and then set a hardware breakpoint on the top of the stack in the Dump Window as shown in the image. You can do this easily by right clicking on the ESP register and clicking on “Follow in Dump”.
Once you reach the POPAD instruction or the hardware breakpoint is activated, this shows that the registers that were saved on the stack are now going to be restored in the respective registers. This indicates that the program has now finished extracting itself and is ready to execute the instructions.
I used OllyDump to dump out the contents of this DLL and then used LordPE to repair the import table. This process, however, needs more work due to the nature of the automated import address table repairing as some things can be missed.
Once this repairing was finished, I opened the file in IDA Pro to disassemble the unpacked DLL. This did give me a lot of information about this DLL, however, I’m still in the process of completing a good disassembly of this DLL.
As for now, I can say that this DLL installed a bunch of spyware CLSIDs into the system.
Some of the CLSIDs (out of the 45 that it uses) by this malware are listed below:

{CF46BFB3-2ACC-441b-B82B-36B9562C7FF1}
{67C55A8D-E808-4caa-9EA7-F77102DE0BB6}
{1557B435-8242-4686-9AA3-9265BF7525A4}
{55DB983C-BDBF-426f-86F0-187B02DDA39B}
{A24B57F8-505D-4fc5-9960-740E304D1ABA}
{4B646AFB-9341-4330-8FD1-C32485AEE619}
{CD3447D4-CA39-4377-8084-30E86331D74C}
{DEBEB52F-CFA6-4647-971F-3EDB75B63AFA}
{8F2183B9-F4DB-4913-8F82-6F9CC42E4CF8}
{92A444D2-F945-4dd9-89A1-896A6C2D8D22}
{1F6581D5-AA53-4b73-A6F9-41420C6B61F1}
{1126271C-A8C3-438c-B951-7C94B453B16B}
{938A8A03-A938-4019-B764-03FF8D167D79}
{44218730-94E0-4b24-BBF0-C3D8B2BCE2C3}

This DLL also seemed to communicate to :

89.188.16.10
89.188.16.16
65.243.103.56
65.243.103.60
65.243.103.62

Whatever you do to these servers is upto you. Some google searches allude that this is a “Vundo infection”. I’m also not sure what solutions people are posting to this problem but I’d not feel safe if this malware was on my computer and I’d definitely format my Windows install, patch it and change my passwords! I’m not completely dne with the disassembly and reversing of this malware yet, but I’m sure I’ll post more when I delve into this disassembled code deeper.

I wanted to install Cisco VPN client on BackTrack3. You can get the Cisco VPN client source using the following command:
wget ftp://ftp.cs.cornell.edu/pub/rvr/upload/vpnclient-linux-4.8.00.0490-k9.tar.gz
tar zxvf vpnclient-linux-4.8.00.0490-k9.tar.gz
cd vpnclient/
wget http://tuxx-home.at/projects/cisco-vpnclient/vpnclient-linux-2.6.22.diff
patch < vpnclient-linux-2.6.22.diff
./vpn_install

I got this information from the following blog.
I ran into an error whereby the kernel sources were not found for the VPN client to install. I then got the BackTrack3 kernel sources.
cd /lib/
wget http://www.offensive-security.com/kernel.lzm
mkdir test
lzm2dir kernel.lzm test

Now go into the vpnclient directory and execute the following:
./vpn_install

Accept the defaults (except in my case I selected “No” on automatically start VPN client). When it asks for the sources point it to:
/lib/test/usr/src/linux-2.6.21.5

Then the VPN Client should compile without any issues. Then you just need to place your Cisco VPN client Profile (.pcf) in the /etc/opt/cisco-vpnclient/Profiles directory. You will need to first start the VPN client service first using:

/etc/init.d/vpnclient_init start

Once the service is started just connect using:

vpnclient connect mypcffile user test password <whatever>

Please note that the full name of the Profile file in the above case is mypcffile.pcf but I’ve deliberately excluded the .pcf extension.
This should work.

So I decided to use WPA2 Personal with AES+TKIP on my new Linksys WRT54GL router after my old D-Link router died. However, there were some issues in getting it to work on Kubuntu 6.10 Edgy Eft with my Intel Wireless IPW3945abg.
So I decided to put my /etc/network/interfaces and the /etc/wpa_supplicant.conf files up here for reference:
Suppose BLAH is my ESSID name. The psk value is an altered value for elucidation purposes only:

ctrl_interface=/var/run/wpa_supplicant
ctrl_interface_group=0
eapol_version=1
ap_scan=2
fast_reauth=1

# WPA-PSK
network={
ssid="BLAH"
proto=WPA RSN
key_mgmt=WPA-PSK
pairwise=TKIP
group=TKIP
psk=aaaa3fa7bbbbccccf6d44e199ecb2bebccccad25a0778beeee104db0b3fffff7
}

The value of the PSK command was obtained by using the value associated with the prefix “psk=…” after issuing the following command:

# wpa_passphrase BLAH passphrase
network={
       ssid="BLAH"
       #psk="passphrase"
       psk=aaaa3fa7bbbbccccf6d44e199ecb2bebccccad25a0778beeee104db0b3fffff7
}

The /etc/network/interfaces looked like this:

auto lo
iface lo inet loopback

auto eth1
iface eth1 inet dhcp
wpa-conf managed
wpa-driver wext
wpa-ssid BLAH
wpa-ap-scan 2
wpa-proto RSN
wpa-pairwise TKIP
wpa-group TKIP
wpa-key-mgmt WPA-PSK
wpa-psk aaaa3fa7bbbbccccf6d44e199ecb2bebccccad25a0778beeee104db0b3fffff7
pre-up wpa_supplicant -Bw -Dwext -i eth1 -c/etc/wpa_supplicant.conf
post-down killall -q wpa_supplicant

Once I was done with this configuration all I had to do was, issue the following command to get wireless working with WPA2 and TKIP:

# /etc/init.d/networking restart

This was my first hope conference (The Next HOPE Conference)despite being in New York City for more than half a decade. Always it seemed that work would send me out of town just before the con. However, this time around I had the good fortune of being in the city during the conference.
There were a few good talks some of which were not so technical but kindled the questions for privacy fanatics.
The talks I attended included Alessio Pennasilico’s talk about DDoS attack on Bakeca.it, Modern Crimeware and Tools talk by Alexander Heid, Steven Rambam’s talk on Privacy is Dead, Blaze Mouse Cheswick et. al’s talk which was abstract but awesome. I did attend a few more talks and it was fun. All in all a great conference.

This had me stumped but it’s not that tough. The persona website getpersonas.com tends to install personas without any permissions. But you can disable it by typing “about:config” in the Firefox address bar and remove any entry in the following property: lightweightThemes.usedThemes
There it is…you’ve now disabled personas!

One of my acquaintances told me today of an innovative scam.
So this friend of mine posted an advertisement for renting her apartment out on craigslist. As soon as she posted the ad, an email response came that looked absolutely legitimate.
The respondent claimed that he was a professor in the UK and would be visiting the US on a sabbatical. He even listed a phone number for contact as well as gave some very legitimate looking references. The respondent also said that he wanted to rent the apartment in about 1 months’ time. So far all good. My friend contacted the respondent over the phone and there was nothing odd about the conversation.
In the subsequent conversations, the respondent requested my friend to collect delivery of the furniture for his apartment (which he had indicated that he was going to rent). The respondent said that he would send a check to her and she should then collect the delivery of the furniture and pay the furniture company out of her own pocket. The respondent even sent in a personal check to my friend in advance. She deposited it and sure enough, the amount showed up in the bank account. But what had her spooked out, was how could someone give away a check to some one just like that. For some reason, due to a weird hunch, she decided that she was not going to engage in any financial transactions on the behalf of someone who was sitting hundreds of miles away who she barely knew. In the end, it was this hunch that saved her from losing the money.
So the respondent (thinking that my friend had agreed to undertake the transaction on his behalf) gave her the phone number and information of the furniture company. My friend googled the furniture company but could not find anything. Moreover, the furniture company would not even pick up the phone. This put my friend in doubt over the dubiousness of the potential renter. As it turned out, that the check bounced a couple of days later and if she’d paid the furniture company it might have been used as a way to steal money from my unsuspecting friend.
I guess what could be interesting to know here is that if there was a legitimate phone number (say from Google voice) and a legitimate website (which costs a few dollars for a month now), then my friend could have possibly been duped.
This serves as a reminder to us of the reality of the world we’re living in where scammers are looking for an opportunity to dupe us.